

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

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TO:

|    |            | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----|------------|--------|------|------|---------|
| 1  | DCI        |        | X    |      |         |
| 2  | DDCI       |        | X    |      |         |
| 3  | EXDIR      |        |      |      |         |
| 4  | D/ICS      |        |      |      |         |
| 5  | DDI        |        | X    |      |         |
| 6  | DDA        |        |      |      |         |
| 7  | DDO        |        |      |      |         |
| 8  | DDS&T      |        |      |      |         |
| 9  | Chm/NIC    |        | X    |      |         |
| 10 | GC         |        |      |      |         |
| 11 | IG         |        |      |      |         |
| 12 | Compt      |        |      |      |         |
| 13 | D/OCA      |        | X    |      |         |
| 14 | D/PAO      |        |      |      |         |
| 15 | D/PERS     |        |      |      |         |
| 16 | D/Ex Staff |        |      |      |         |
| 17 | C/ACIS     |        | X    |      |         |
| 18 | D/SOVA/DI  |        | X    |      |         |
| 19 | D/OSWR/DI  |        | X    |      |         |
| 20 | NIO/USSR   |        | X    |      |         |
| 21 | NIO/AT CBW |        | X    |      |         |
| 22 | <i>ER</i>  |        |      |      |         |

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

7 Jul '87

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Executive Registry

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July 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
 THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons (CW) Arms Control (U)

Following a review of agency views at a Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) meeting on June 19, 1987, on Chemical Weapons (CW) arms control policy, this guidance is provided for CW arms control negotiations. This guidance is consistent with the provisions of NSDD-136 of April 2, 1984, on CW arms control and the relevant verification section of NSDD-160 of January 24, 1985. (C)

The overall US approach to CW arms control will continue to be to pursue an effective global ban on chemical weapons. The US will continue to support the draft US treaty now before the Conference on Disarmament (CD) while recognizing that significant requirements remain, some of which we do not yet know how to solve, to develop effective verification of such a ban. Thus, the US will pursue negotiations toward a global ban in a deliberate manner, while concurrently working to develop measures that will provide a sufficient basis for determination by the USG that the draft treaty contains the verification provisions required to protect the security interests of the US and its Allies. (S)

The US Delegation to the CD should be guided during the summer session by the instructions cabled on June 27 as agreed upon by the interagency community and approved by the NSC. (S)

The next US-Soviet CW bilateral round of negotiations will begin on July 20, 1987, with an agenda focusing on data exchange and other issues, including challenge inspection and definition of production facilities, as agreed upon by the interagency community and approved by the NSC in instructions to the US CD Delegation cabled on June 27. (C)

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In preparation for USG consideration of CW arms control issues prior to the January 1988 CD session, the CW Interdepartmental Group (IG) should proceed with a comprehensive work program for this summer and early fall to develop agreed USG positions on, inter alia, the following:

- USG support for, or suggested modification to, elements of the French proposal of June 16, 1987, for a CW security stockpile, including the conditions of final destruction, with particular attention to whether the USG should propose to introduce appropriately modified elements of the French proposal as alterations to the USG's draft treaty on CW to ensure a sufficient binary CW deterrent capability;
- When and how the prohibition on production of CW should occur within a reductions scheme, and how the legitimate chemical industries of Treaty Parties can be monitored effectively;
- How bilateral exchanges of data should be handled in a CW treaty regime;
- Whether, and if so how, to support the establishment of a Consultative Committee and an International Inspectorate as part of the administration of a CW treaty regime; and
- The makeup of the US inspection team on CW arms control, to include a review by all agencies of the proposed Memorandum of Agreement of May 8, 1987, forwarded to the NSC by the Departments of State and Defense and by CIA and to include consideration of inspection teams for other arms control efforts, e.g., INF and CDE. (S)

The CW IG should place particular emphasis on developing a set of measures and safeguards to be applied by the USG during any CW destruction period incorporated into a global ban on chemical weapons. (S)

The CW IG is requested to review and submit for final NSC approval the draft public diplomacy guidance of April 1987, which outlines US CW arms control objectives and the negotiations process. In doing so, the IG should ensure that public diplomacy themes avoid creating any impression that the US has abandoned our long-standing goal of seeking an effective global ban on CW or, at the same time, suggest that the US expects to conclude a CW arms control treaty in the near future, and certainly not until the conditions we have maintained as requirements for the effectiveness of any treaty have been satisfied. (S)

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
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Inherent in all aspects of the USG approach to CW arms control negotiations is the associated US requirement to maintain a modern and credible CW deterrent until such time as the threat posed by CW is effectively eliminated. Therefore, given that this is not achievable in the near-term and that existing USG chemical stocks must be replaced due to aging, agencies should tailor CW negotiations approaches and the CW public diplomacy plan accordingly. (S)

Any approach recommended should permit the US to develop and possess sufficient military capability, relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union, to execute US National Military Strategy with reasonable assurance of success. In this regard, the Department of Defense should continue vigorously to pursue development and production of a modern, safe and, effective CW deterrent capability. (S)

Drawing on interagency-approved materials, the CW interagency community should continue to brief Congress regularly on the status of the CW negotiations with special emphasis on the serious remaining obstacles to effective verification associated with any global CW ban and on the absolute requirement to maintain a credible modern CW deterrent capability until the threat posed by CW indeed can be eliminated by an effective treaty. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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